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New president, old friends? 
Whether the outpouring of anger that 
swept Indonesia in May hastens moves 
over East Timor, one thing is certain: 
western governments will find it 
increasingly embarrassing to prop up any 
regime in Jakarta that so clearly defies the 
popular will. 
Indonesia's presidentSuhartofinallystepped down on 21 May, leaving the presidency to his 
deputy, Jusuf Habibie, in response to the riots 
which had brought students and workers onto 
the streets. Over 500 had died in a matter of 
days. Habibie faces a difficult transition, distrusted 
both by the democracy movement and the 
military. An election has been promised for 1999, 
but this is unlikely to satisfy his opponents, who 
are keen to keep up the momentum of 
democratic reform. With the release of two 
prominent dissidents, Sri Bintang Pamungkas 
and Moch tar Pakpahan, Western governments, 
led by Portugal, and backed by Australia, the US 
and Britain, have called for the release ofXanana 
Gusmao. The West had worked hard to shore up 
Suharto, protecting Western financial institutions 
and investors who have much to lose if the 
Indonesian economy collapses. This translated 
not only into the IMF rescue package, but soft-
peddling on human rights and democracy issues 
- compromising UK government claims to an 
ethical foreign policy. As Andrew Rawnsley put 
it in The Observernewspaper, in Indonesia Robin 
Cook's ethics were 'dying on the streets'. 
Missed opportunities 
In April Indonesia twice escaped censure by 
Western powers - first at the Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM II ) in London and then at the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
in Geneva. Western governments might have 
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hoped that the Indonesian military wou ld 
manage a smooth succession so that business 
could return to normal. But they should ask 
whether and for how long the Indonesian people 
would settle for another Suharto. The people's 
protest, although directed at Suharto and the 
corruption of his family and friends, is not just 
about him. It is a call for a more democratic and 
open society. The military has devoted itself to 
the defence of the corrupt, and is itself tainted. 
J ose Ramos-Horta, representing the East 
Timorese resistance in exile, was cautiously 
hopeful about the impact on East Timor: 'The 
Indonesian students have shown the courage 
and moral force to tell Suharto and the 
international community that the Indonesian 
people have suffered enough . They have proved 
to be at the front of the Indonesian democracy 
movement and, as such, I believe they will 
embrace the East Timorese struggle for self-
determination. ' 
ASEM II 
Although under no public pressure to support 
Asian countries, the European Union (EU) has 
been fully supportive of the IMF approach in 
Indonesia, reflecting the extent to whi ch 
European financia l institutions need th e 
Indonesian markets. The Asia-Europe Meeting 
(ASEM II), in London on 3-4 Apri l, was 
dominated by the Asian financial crisis . 
Prominen tAsian leaders, such as Jiang Zemin of 
China, Fidel Ramos of the Philippines and 
Suharto oflndonesia, stayed away and the event 
itself received relatively little media attention. 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) came 
together for two days prior to the official summit. 
The Asia Europe People's Forum gained little 
access to governmentleaders and its demands for 
a people-centred economic strategy for Asia-
Europe relations - including increased access, 
accountabili ty, consultation and participation, 
plus a broader ASEM agenda including 
governance, environmental and human rights 
issues - struggled to be heard as the inter-
governmental conference confined itself to 
economics and the financial crisis. UK prime 
minister Tony Blair stated that Europe would not 
be a fair-weather friend, and would assist itsAsian 
partners in their time of need-comforting words 
for Indonesia's then vice-president, Habibie, 
attending his firstASEM summit. 
Human righ ts issues were raised at two events 
staged by solidarity groups and people 's 
organisations. The Alternative State Reception, 
organised by the Free Tibet Campaign , the 
Burma Action Group and the British Coalition 
for East Tim or, attracted more than 400 human 
rights, democracy and environmental activists 
from Asia and Europe who heard pre-recorded 
messages from Daw Aung San Suu Kyi , of the 
Burmese National League for Democracy, and 
the Dalai Lama. Jose Ramos-Horta assured 
European and other western leaders that the 
East Timorese people would survive,justas they 
had survived when Henry Kissinger, Ronald 
Reagan, Margaret Thatcher and others had 
presided over world affairs. 
Some 2,000 people demonstrated on 4 April 
outside the inter-governmental conference and 
in Trafalgar Square. Unfortunately, the main 
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message from the British governmen t - that 
economic concerns hold sway O\'er social issues 
-must ha,·e gi\'en the Indonesian go\'ernment 
confidence a~ it went to the :i -1-th session of the 
United \!atio ns Commission on Human Rights 
(C \.'CHR 5-1-) . 
UNCHR 
In :\pril 1997 the CN passed a strong resolution 
on Indonesia 's acti\'ities in East Timor, co-
sponsored lJ\ the EU under the Dutch presidency. 
In the months that followed, however, the human 
1ightssituation in EastTimordeteriorated. Graffiti 
left on bodies referring to the Nobel peace prize 
and the visit of UN special representative, 
Jamsheed Marker, implied that human rights 
abuses were committed against East Timorese 
civilians by the Indonesian army in direct response 
to the UN censure. In the meantime, the 
Indonesian authorities entirely ignored the 
resolution 's clauses. 
Human rights organisations such as Amnesty 
International and the East Tim or Human Rights 
Centre in Melbourne, as well as networks such as 
the Christian Consultation on East Timor 
(CCET), had been lobbying governments for a 
1998 resolution on East Tim or of at least equal 
strength to last year's. Ata foreign office briefing 
in January this year non-governmental 
organisations received assurances that during its 
presidency of the EU the British government 
would co-sponsor a resolution broadly the same 
as the one passed last year. 
The CCET still sent a representative to the 
UNCHR in Geneva to drum up support for the 
draft resolution, and meetings with the British 
delegation drew further assurances that officials 
would be lobbying for the resolution . By the 
fourth week of the commission it was clear that 
27 governments were prepared to vote in favour, 
more than voted forthe resolution a year ago. The 
East Timorese resistance was greatly encouraged. 
Betrayed 
However, it emerged in the week leading up to 
the vote that the British had been negotiatingwith 
the Indonesian government for a weak 
'chairman'sstatement' in place ofafull resolution. 
The resolution sank without trace and the 
consensus statement merely mentioned a possible 
visit by the UN working group on arbitrary 
detentions sometime before the next UNCHR. 
The East Timorese felt cruelly betrayed. Again 
their plight appeared to be of no concern to 
western governments. Again the Indonesian 
regime was allowed to ignore human rights. The 
people of East Timor, and civil groups abroad, 
who sought to increase Britain's international 
integrity, deser\'e an explanation. 
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EAST TIMOR: lime for change 
Tim or, area 7 ,400 square miles, is one of the 
easternmost islands of the Indonesian 
archipelago and lies 300 miles north of 
Australia, its nearest neighbour. The western 
part of the island, formerly a Dutch colony, 
belongs to Indonesia, whereas East Timor was 
for more than 400 years a Portuguese colony. 
In 1974 Portugal began decolonising East 
Timor. Newly formed political parties 
discussed options for the future. The 
Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) initially 
favoured federation with Portugal but then 
formed a coalition with Fretilin, the 
nationalist liberation movement, to demand 
independence. A small third party, Apodeti, 
was used as a vehicle for Indonesian 
propaganda in favour of integration. 
On 11 August 1975 the UDT staged a coup 
to pre-empt Indonesian threats to intervene 
if Fretilin came to power. In the ensuing civil 
war 1,500 people lost their lives. By September 
1975, however, Fretilin was fo control of 
virtually all of Portuguese Timor, following 
the defection of Timorese colonial troops to 
the liberation movement's side. 
Indonesia, like the United States, was 
worried by the proximity of an independent 
state with radical policies and continued to 
threaten East Timor, despite previous 
assurances that Jakarta would respect the right 
of the East Timorese to independence. In 
September 1975 Indonesia closed West Tllllor 
to journalists and on 7 December it launched 
a full-scale invasion of East Timor with the 
knowledge of the United States and the 
encouragement of Australia. After a fraudulent 
'act of self-determination' in May 1976, East 
Timor was declared to be Indonesia's '27th 
Province' in July 1976. The United Nations 
regards the annexation as illegal. 
The invasion and annexation of East Tunor 
has been brutal: up to 200,000 people, a third 
of the population, have died as a result of 
Indonesian rule. But the majority of Timorese 
have not accepted subjugation: Indonesia has 
been unable to eliminate the desire of the East 
Timorese for self-determination and an armed 
resistance movement still remains in the hills. 
Although the invasion has been condemned 
by successive UN resolutions, the international 
community has done little or nothing to 
implement them, given the major economic 
and geopolitical interests of the United States, 
Japan and particularly Australia in the region. 
Indonesia's crucial strategic location and 
regional status - it has the world's fifth largest 
population, and large reserves of oil and other 
natural resources - have all encouraged the 
world to downplay East Timor's agony. 
In recent years, however, several events 
have combined to break East Timor's isolation 
and bring its continued occupation to inter-
national attention. In 1989 the Pope visited 
the territory and in 1991 the planned visit of a 
parliamentary delegation from Portugal, still 
considered the administering authority of East 
Timor by the UN, created huge expectations 
of change. To great disappointment in East 
Timor, the delegation was forced in October 
1991 to call off its visit. 
On 12 November 1991 Indonesian troops 
shot and killed up to 300 East Timorese 
civilians during a funeral procession held at the 
Santa Cruz cemetery in Dill, the East Timorese 
capital, for a victim of repression. Witnessed 
by foreign journalists, the Santa Cruz massacre 
provided indisputable evidence of Indonesian 
atrocities. 
The Santa Cruz massacre has forced 
governments around the world to criticise 
Indonesia's brutality, injecting new impetus 
into diplomatic efforts to bring about a 
solution to East Timor's suffering. Since 1983 
the UN secretary-general has been entrusted 
with the achievement of a settlement to the 
dispute; and with the post-Cold War era 
providing a new international climate for nego-
tiations, Indonesia faces increased pressure 
to reach a solution with Portugal and the East 
Timorese under the auspices of the UN. 
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East Timor: Prospects for 
anindependenteconom 
The transition from being a 'province' of Indonesia to being an independent state would pose 
enormous challenges for East Timor. Apart from questions over a constitution, a bill of rights and the 
structure of a new government, the country would have to choose an appropriate macro-economic 
model. All sectors would face the same basic questions: how to pursue development while ensuring 
the economy grows rapidly enough to provide job opportunities and generate incomes; how to 
achieve long-term growth and promote social welfare. Does East Timor need to be 'part of the rupiah 
zone' as argued by Dalrymple (1995) and Soesastro (1991)? Or should it remain an agrarian society 
on a subsistence model for the foreseeable future? Or can East Timor simply take the Indonesian model 
of development, pembangunan, as a guide? 
This discussion paper outlines the economic challenges facing East Timor and attempts to deal with 
some of these questions. The author, a Timorese economist who for security reasons remains 
anonymous, proposes a phased export-oriented model of development as the best route for East Timor 
in the long run. Timar Link is publishing the paper as a special supplement in an effort to stimulate 
a debate that urgently needs to happen, and we invite readers to respond. 
The views contained here do not necessarily reflect those of Timor Link's editors. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Small economies in east Asia and the Pacific have 
demonstrated that growth is possible even in difficult 
situations. Singapore is one example. In 1965, after leaving 
the Malaysian Federation, the Singapore government 
decided to transform its impoverished, tiny territory and 
move rapidly to an export-oriented industrialisation 
strategy. Since 1987 Singapore has been a regional service 
centre characterised by high-tech industrialisation (Castells 
1992:35-7). The economy of post-war Taiwan also 
prospered when the country turned to market 
liberalisation (Cheng and Hsiung 1991:233-66), and South 
Korea made a major transition in the 1960s, transforming 
capital into industry, expanding capital, and creating 
conditions for capital accumulation (Woo 1991 :115-6; 
Hamilton 1983:53). Hong Kong also rapidly attained 
export capability, building its economy on entrepot trade 
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(acting as a point of transshipment) and low-wage 
manufacturing. In these newly-industrialised countries 
(NICs), the state - usually highly coercive, relatively 
independent from certain social sectors, and capable of 
restructuring society and directing the market (Woo 1991: 
2ff) - has played a leading role in industrialising the 
economies. 
The small states of western Europe, on the other hand, 
grew by exploiting niches. Norway developed a shipping 
industry, Switzerland established a high-tech industry and 
financial services, and Sweden and Finland expanded their 
highly skilled, high-tech manufacturing industries 
(Shapiro and Taylor 1990: 970). 
In the Pacific, Fiji embarked on a market-oriented 
economy which grew and diversified after the 1987 coups 
(Elek et al 1993), based mainly on agro-industry (sugar), 
tourism and light manufacturing (the garment trade). 
Tonga and Western Samoa, on the other hand, pursued a 
subsistence model, relying on agricultural products such 
as cocoa, copra, vanilla and vegetables . 
In the shor t term, East Timor cannot be expec ted to 
emulate the export performance of the NICs or the small 
states of Western Europe because of its low skills level, 
small domestic markets and shortage of capital resources 
- characteristics of underdeveloped small states. 
However, governments in small states have managed to 
develop niche industries and attract foreign capital. 
East Timor has to build up a minimum threshold of 
foreign exchange reserves or per capita export earnings for 
the country to survive beyond modest horizons, respond 
to changes in the global market and sustain economic 
growth. According to Myint (1984:222) 'countries that 
expanded their exports have also tended to enjoy rapid 
economic development, and significant correlations have 
been found between the growth of exports and the growth 
of national income among the underdeveloped countries' . 
In the long run, East Timor must pursue a phased, 
export-oriented model for its economy. Although this 
might seem unlikely for such an underdeveloped country 
whose people have depended on subsistence agriculture, 
reforms implemented over 20 to 30 years could see East 
Timor' s economy develop on an export-led model based 
on manufacturing and industry. 
Before this is possible, however, a surplus must be 
created from East Timor's primary products and structural 
changes must take place so the Timorese can market this 
surplus. In the short term, restructuring and expanding the 
agricultural sector should be the priority. This requires 
land reform and expanding cash and food crop 
production. These changes will increase exports from the 
agricultural sector, opening the country up to global 
markets , expanding foreign exchange earnings and 
creating job opportunities. In the medium term, East Timor 
will also have to develop its manufacturing and industrial 
base, which will take longer because of its small 
population (the population is expected to be around 2.5 
million in 30 years' time). 
The economy will grow more rapidly if oil and gas 
revenues are forthcoming . Higher growth rates will 
depend on more foreign capital, and investment in human 
resources, and in the medium term there will be some 
imbalance between domestic savings and investment as 
the government is forced to play an active role in 
transforming and restructuring the economy. 
2. PEMBANGUNAN - SUCCESSES 
AND FAILURES 
From the mid to late 1970s the government of Indonesia 
introduced its unique model of economic development, 
called pembangunan, to bring 'civilization' and 'progress' to 
East Timor. In its attempt to overcome poverty, illiteracy 
and backwardness, a legacy of Portuguese colonialism, the 
government pursued rapid economic growth. 
Pembangunan was carried out in four distinct phases: 
1) Rehabilitation (1976-77) - involved massive political 
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indoctrination and security operations; and Bahasa 
Indonesia, the Indonesian language, was introduced to 
accelerate integration. 
2) Consolidation (1977-78) - thousands of Timorese were 
resettled in concentration camps; as a consequence crop 
production and livestock farming declined. 
3) Stabilisation (1978-79) - there were massive military 
operations; approximately 200,000 civilians lost their 
lives in concentration camps from mass killings, 
widespread famine and contagious diseases. 
4) Short-term development (1979-84) - new roads were 
constructed to aid military operations, and schools were 
built so people would learn Indonesian language, 
history, culture and ideology. 
Since then East Timor has had three five-year plans, 
beginning in 1984, 1989 and 1994. 
Between 1976 and 1996 approximately US$2.5 billion 
poured into East Timor to carry out this 'civilising 
mission'. The Indonesian government cultivated a picture 
of a country, once suffering from neglect under Portuguese 
rule but now enjoying the benefits of high investment. 
According to Indonesian statistics the results are 
impressive: the economic growth rate was, on average, 
8 per cent a year between 1980 and 1992; gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita increased from US$60 in 1975 to 
US$80 in 1991, growing at an average rate of 4.5 per cent a 
year between 1980 and 1990; some 1,400 kilometres of new 
roads were constructed, giving the country a total of 3,795 
kilometres of roads, linking all districts and sub-districts 
with the capital city; 579 primary schools were built, 71 
high schools, one new polytechnic, one university, and 
several health centres (Bappeda dan Statistik 1991; 1992; 
Soesastro 1991; Saldanha 1995). 
However, economic development has been 
accompanied by many problems, ranging from 
environmental degradation as a result of deforestation to 
help military surveillance of Timorese guerrillas, to 
monopoly ownership of former Portuguese coffee 
plantations, to massive migration of the people into the 
countryside . East Timor has been so dependent on 
Jakarta's financial resources and expertise that all key 
financial and policy decisions have been made by 
administrative institutions in Jakarta. This has led to 
dependence on Jakarta's subsidies and has concentrated 
power at the 'provincial' level. Under pembangunan the 
government provides the goods and believes it knows 
what is best for the region's future . Programmes are 
imposed regardless of local needs, often generating extra 
income for contractors and government officials. Local 
people scarcely participate in development decisions, 
despite claims by the authorities that there is a grassroots 
approach. Today local people occupy most of the clerical 
and junior posts, and Indonesian migrants control key 
positions in the administration and the economy. 
Capital resources are concentrated on developing the 
physical infrastructure of urban centres - schools, 
hospitals, water supplies and communications. These are 
capital intensive projects which are expensive to maintain 
and add little to regional income. More than 30 per cent of 
the total development budget has been allocated to 
construction, transport and communication, yet these 
sectors absorbed only 1.7 per cent of the labour force in 
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1992 (Bappeda 1993). Despite the dramatic increase in the 
number of schools, the overall quality of education in East 
Timor remains low because facilities such as laboratories 
and libraries are inadequate, and there are not enough 
qualified teachers. Political re-education sessions are 
conducted in all these schools, in which the Timorese are 
taught reverence for the national leadership - loyalty to 
the regime in Jakarta . There is a shortage of skilled 
personnel to meet economic needs. 
The economy of East Timar resembles the economies of 
most small islands that have gained independence from 
colonial rule. Agriculture accounts for nearly 40 per cent of 
GDP, government and defence for 20 per cent, construction 
18 per cent and trade 10 per cent. East Timor's once vibrant 
tourist industry has collapsed and there is no industrial 
production. From 1983 to 1996 industry accounted for less 
than 2 per cent of GDP. Exports represent only 6 per cent of 
GDP and constitute less than 3 per cent of the total budget. 
Coffee, East Timor's most reliable export commodity, was, 
until recently, under the control of a military-backed 
company, PT Denok Hernandes Indonesia, but now big 
coffee plantations left by the Portuguese-owned Sociedade 
Agricola Patria e Trabalho (SAPT), and the small 
plantations owned by small and medium farmers, have 
been monopolised by Suharto's cronies, under different 
company names. With the exception of the fazenda coffee 
plantation belonging to Mario Carrascalao, the Indonesian-
. appointed governor, none of the small plantations have 
been returned to their owners. 
There is also monopoly control of street commerce. 
Recent studies (Mubyarto et al 1990; Saldanha 1995) show 
that more than 90 per cent of street commerce, and almost 
80 per cent of large- and medium-sized businesses are in 
the hands of Indonesian migrants. Given the lack of 
entrepreneurial and managerial skills among Timorese-
owned companies, it is not surprising that government 
projects allocated to them are subcontracted to companies 
owned by Indonesian migrants. 
As a result, many East Timorese live in deep poverty . In 
the early 1990s, nearly 53 per cent of children under the 
age of five were malnourished and 10 per cent of adults 
suffered from iron-deficiency anaemia, resulting in a lack 
of energy and stamina and weakened resistance to disease 
among adults, and retarded growth among children. The 
1996 World Population Report by the United Nations 
Population Fund showed that East Timar had the worst 
infant mortality rate among the world's 30 least developed 
countries and territories, at 135 per 1,000 births (compared 
with 13 per 1,000 births in 1953, which was below average 
for an underdeveloped territory) (Felgas 1956:192). And 
· this despite an increase in the number of doctors and 
health facilities. East Timor also had the lowest life 
expectancy among those same countries (48.4 for women 
and 46.7 for men), while adult illiteracy remains high at 60 
per cent. In terms of per capita income, health, education, 
access to water, and poor housing, 48 per cent of Timorese 
still lived below the poverty line in 1993, and 71 per cent of 
villages were classified as impoverished (desa tertinggal in 
Indonesian) according to standards used by Indonesia's 
National Planning Bureau (BAPPENAS). 
The systematic destruction of forests has been one of 
the biggest impediments to social and economic 
development in East Timor. Deforestation has accelerated 
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erosion, causing landslides and impoverishing soils, 
thereby reducing the capacity of the land to support 
human life in the near future. No reforestation has taken 
place in the affected areas. 
3. A PHASED EXPORT-ORIENTED 
ECONOMY AND THE ROLE OF THE 
STATE 
The macro-economic policies which were so important in 
the NICs cannot simply be applied to East Timor for two 
reasons. First, pembangunan has unbalanced the economy 
of East Timor and this will have a strong bearing on the 
transition process. Second, East Timor ha s neither a 
qualified labour force, nor an entrepreneurial class, and the 
economy has not been exposed to an industrial culture. 
This will increase the amount of investment needed in the 
short term and limit private consumption. 
But this does not mean East Timor should simply opt 
for a food self-sufficiency model of economic development, 
such as those adopted by Tonga and Western Samoa. An 
attempt at food self-sufficiency, as suggested by both 
Soesastro (1991) and Saldanha (1995), might see East Timor 
begging its neighbours for food supplies if its domestic 
harvest fails . Alternatively, if international commodity 
prices remain low, the self-sufficiency route might lead to 
low productivity, which will prevent farmers purchasing 
the manufactured goods necessary for agricultural output 
or private use. Therefore, agricultural output must be 
increased in order to meet domestic food requirements, 
and agriculture must be developed to provide the surplus 
necessary to speed growth. 
At independence, most East Timorese farmers are likely 
to demand new plantation technologies, and meeting this 
need will require a substantial increase in land and 
scientific input. The role of the state will be crucial in 
promoting agricultural output, by maintaining and 
revitalising high value-added products, and expanding the 
actual production capacity. Smallholders, once confined to 
their own subsistence crops, will have to become part of 
the global commercial agricultural markets. In other 
words, East Timor will have to concentrate on exporting 
those agricultural products which give it, or will give it, a 
comparative advantage, and gradually move away from 
subsistence production by developing and diversifying its 
products. 
A. Priority one: Land reform and 
agricultural expansion 
1. Land reform 
Before the Indonesian invasion there was no land 
ownership in East Timor. Every household (normally five 
or six people) was allowed to cultivate a piece of land 
(three hectares at most) for its own needs within an area 
which remained part of the village's dominion. The liurai 
(the traditional ruler of the area) had to give permission 
before the land could be cultivated. In return, every 
cultivator had to pay a rai teen (some 10 per cent of 
production) and provide services to the liurai. The liurai's 
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home farm opera ted w ith labour provided b y the 
cultivators. The majority of the population had to work 
h a rd for their subsistence, and sometimes produced 
e n ou g h to ta ke surplu s produce to the markets in 
surrounding areas. This practice allowed the cultivators to 
stay on the land for many years. 
When the Por tuguese colonisers a rrived they 
established planta tions, mainly of coffee, rubber, cashew 
and cocoa. Coffee w as the most profitable commodity. 
Until the late 1960s, 40 per cent of coffee was produced by 
SA PT, 10 p er cent by 'landowners' (the mesti<;os , 
Europeans, literate Timorese or the liurais) , and 50 per cent 
by smallholders (Thomaz 1994:677). 
However, this practice changed with the Indonesian 
resettlement scheme, which uprooted the majority of the 
Timorese from their knua (traditional villages) and to' os 
(gardens) with adverse consequences for agricultural 
production, but favourable ones for the new owners of 
large holdings. The resettled Timorese were moved to 
fragile environments on the north coast where each 
household tilled a small piece of land in the backyard of a 
small house built by the military and the local government. 
These households cannot produce enough food even to be 
self sufficient. Meanwhile, the social cohesion of the 
villages has been broken, leading to land disputes and 
uncertainty about land 'ownership'. Productivity is so low 
that most surplus is consumed rather than marketed. It is 
difficult, therefore, for anyone to accumulate capital. 
If agriculture is to be revitalised and expanded for 
commercial purposes the population must be allowed to 
return to their knua and to' os . It is imperative that each 
farming family can at least feed themselves and provide 
some cash crops or crafts so they can purchase consumer 
items. This could be achieved if there were sufficient land 
and certainty about land rights. Land reform is crucial if 
agriculture is to help remove the 'landlords' and create a 
significant number of owner-cultivators - the basis for 
commercial farming and greater equality. This must be a 
political and economic strategy. Land reform can lead to 
sustainable long-term economic growth and increase the 
efficiency of the agricultural sector. For example, Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan all implemented extensive land reforms 
before they embarked on industrialisation (World Bank 
1993:159). 
2. Agricultural expansion 
But land reform alone cannot guarantee an increase in 
agricultural production great enough to generate income, 
unless farmers are willing and able to produce enough 
food crops to sustain themselves and expand their 
production of cash crops to create a surplus. 
A. Cash crops 
The contribution of cash crops to economic growth is 
summarised in an article by Maxwell and Fernando (1989) 
who argue that cash crops can increase households' and 
countries' incomes by exploiting their comparative 
ad vantage. This maximises surpluses and attracts the 
foreign investment needed by small countries to accelerate 
growth. 
This paper does not discuss all of East Tirnor' s primary 
products but it is worth mentioning coffee, cocoa, cashew, 
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and sandalwood. Given the fragile environment and its 
monsoonal climate, East Timor should not develop any 
cash crops for logging. 
Coffee: Coffee plantations were first opened by the 
Portuguese settlers in the late 18th century in Ermera 
(60 per cent), Manufahi (13 per cent), Ainaro (10 per cent), 
Bobonaro (9 per cent), and Liquica (8 per cent), covering an 
area of approximately 78,000 hectares. Coffee has been East 
Timor's most reliable commodity since the late 19th 
century and the country has long been known for the high 
quality of its Arabica coffee, one of two types of coffee 
cultivated by the Timorese - the other is Robusta (24 per 
cent) . More than 90 per cent of East Timor's export 
earnings come from coffee. Between 1987 and 1990, for 
example, coffee exports contributed some US$12.5 million 
to foreign exchange earnings (Departemen Pertanian 
1991:20). 
Despite East Timor's favourable climatic conditions, 
fertile soil and cheap labour, however, productivity has 
remained low, at 145 kilogrammes per hectare (kg/ha). 
This is for two reasons. First, the Indonesian invasion 
caused some 27,000 hectares of plantation to be destroyed 
between the mid 1970s and the early 1980s, and little has 
been done to repair these since. Second, insufficient efforts 
have been made to rehabilitate aging coffee plants. 
Presumably one reason PT Denok Hernandes Indonesia 
and other companies have shown little interest in investing 
their money in replanting and rejuvenating plants is 
because they are uncertain whether they will get any 
profits out of the plantations in the future, although the 
area of land dedicated to coffee production could be 
expanded by 60 per cent in coffee-growing districts in the 
medium term. 
Since 1996 new small and medium-sized coffee 
'owners' have emerged and have exported small quantities 
of coffee, although the largest proportion is still produced, 
processed and traded by the big plantation 'landlords'. The 
total area cultivated by smallholders is 34,000 hectares 
spread over five districts, Ermera, Liquica, Aileu, Ainaro 
and Manufahi. Small and medium-sized coffee growers 
assisted by an American company, National Cooperative 
Business Association (NCBA), exported 500 tons (10 per 
cent of total production) in 1997 to the United States, 
Europe, Russia and Japan. A further 1,000 tons is expected 
to be exported to these countries this year and a gradual 
increase is expected in the following years. The capital 
earned from exporting coffee has been invested in 
improving the quality of the product. 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and banks 
should provide credit to farmers to help them acquire 
more suitable land for coffee . At the same time, the 
government should begin to issue land titles. Credit could 
be given to farmers wishing to replant leguminous trees 
such <}S Acacia. These act as nitrogen-fixers, re-vegetate 
deforested landscapes, provide shadow for coffee plants 
and increase soil fertility. The areas that need re-vegetation I 
most urgently are Dili, Liquica and Baucau in the north, 
and Covalima, Manatuto and Viqueque in the south. These 
areas need more than 40 per cent forest cover to protect 
water resources for domestic use and to irrigate 
agricultural lands and top soil. 
Sandalwood tree (santalum album) and other crops: 
Relying solely on income from coffee exports wGmld leave 
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East Timar vulnerable to fluctuations in international 
coffee prices. Sandalwood, cocoa and cashew could also be 
potential export commodities. 
- Foreign exchange earnings from sandalwood are 
unknown because the PT Scent Indonesia company has 
monopolised the extraction, processing and marketing of 
this product, and production was severely affected by the 
Indonesian invasion and over-exploitation. Nevertheless, 
together with cocoa and cashew, sandalwood is a high 
value-added crop familiar to Timorese farmers. 
Sandaltrees could be replanted in small plots, while cocoa 
and cashew areas could be expanded considerably - at 
present they cover only 283 hectares and 4,106 hectares 
respectively. Since these cash crops are labour intensive, 
increasing production would also help to reduce 
unemployment rates. 
B. Food crops 
Food crops, particularly rice and maize, account for 21 per 
cent of agriculture's share of GDP, and approximately half 
of the value added by all agricultural products - an 
indication of their potential for increasing food self-
sufficiency. 
Rice and maize: Studies have proved that East Timor's 
soil is fertile, climatic conditions are favourable and, with 
its cheap labour force, these commodities could be 
. profitable. However, at the moment rice productivity is 
low (1.3-2.4 tons/ha). The total area cultivated is about 
22,000 hectares, and between 36,000 and 55,000 tons are 
produced annually. The Indonesian department of 
agriculture said that a minimum input of fertilisers (30 
kilogrammes of urea plus 10 kilogrammes of TSP /ha) will 
increase productivity to 3.5 tons/ha, and with a maximum 
input of fertilisers (50 to 100 kilogrammes of urea plus 20 
to 30 kilogrammes of TSP /ha) it would increase to 5 
tons/ha (Departemen Pertanian 1991:25-6). The area for 
growing rice was estimated to be 67,061 hectares. 
By making optimum use of the existing area some 
200,000 tons of rice and more than 120,000 tons of maize 
could be produced. Production is likely to double if the dry 
land paddy fields, and all potential production areas, are 
used. Assuming average consumption of 190 kilogrammes 
per capita per year, the amount of rice needed would be 
approximately 190,000 tons for a population of 1 million 
people. In this case East Timar, in its normal climatic 
conditions, would not have to import rice for domestic 
consumption. 
To achieve optimum production levels of the best 
quality rice, the government must bear the costs of 
irrigation, mechanisation, education, other scientific needs 
and the supporting infrastructure such as transport, 
warehouses and subsidised credits for the farmers. 
Optimum rice production would contribute to East 
Timor' s balance of payments because rice imports will be 
reduced to a minimum to protect domestic markets. Such 
protection is an approved measure under the General 
Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
Fishing: East Tim or's eoast line is approximately 
656 kilometres long, 340 kilometres on the north coast and 
316 kilometres on the south. Its exclusive economic zone, 
an area stretching 200 miles off the south coast, is about 
_ 116,920 square kilometres, and its territorial waters, 
extending 12 miles off the coast, total 7,548 square 
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kilometres. Together this makes a total of 124,468 square 
kilometres of sea waters, more than in Kiribati, Tuvalu and 
the Cook Islands, for example. It is believed that East 
Timor has the potential to produce approximately 17,000 
tons of fish per year (Departemen Pertanian 1991; 
Soesastro 1991), yet it has the lowest fish production levels, 
and annual per capita consumption levels, of all 
Indonesian provinces. 
This is partly because fishing in deep-sea offshore 
waters has been hindered by inadequate technology, 
manpower, infrastructure and capital. Some attempts have 
been made to produce seaweed on the north coast but 
further development of this could harm the tourist 
industry, as it did in Bali. Giant dam and shellfish farming 
in the island of Atauro could also contribute to East 
Timer's economy, although the economic future of these 
resources remains uncertain. 
B. Priority two: The sugar industry 
In 1996 two of the Suharto's children, 'Tutut' and 
'Tommy', began investing in a new export crop - sugar 
cane. They plan to establish a sugar cane plantation which 
will extend from Manufahi to Viqueque, covering an area 
of 25,000 hectares. Meanwhile, the Indonesian Investment 
Board in Jakarta (BKPM) has approved the construction of 
the largest sugar mill project in Manufahi, expected to 
produce 162 tons of sugar and 8 tons of molasses per year. 
The license was granted to a new Indonesian company, PT 
Putraunggul Sejati, which is planning to invest 
approximately 500,000 billion rupiahs (quoted in 
Aditjondro, 1998). The most important question here is 
whether or not the plantations and factories could be 
retained as economic assets in a free East Timor. The 
possibility of this will be helped if there is a smooth 
transition of power. 
Sugar cane plantations require large amounts of water 
so if sugar is to be grown commercially water must be 
allocated between agro-industry and subsistence crops. 
How this is done needs to be carefully assessed. 
C. Priority three: Developing the 
manufacturing and industrial base 
If East Timor relied solely on exporting primary products 
its trade would be at risk from fluctuations in the price of, 
and demand for, those products. By developing its 
industrial base, it can shift resources from agriculture to 
manufacturing to offset this vulnerability. Raul Prebisch 
(1950) has argued that countries exporting manufactured 
goods find that demand grows more rapidly relative to 
supply than those exporting primary products. East Timor 
could develop in three markets, namely cement, the 
garment trade and tourism. 
1. Cement 
An extensive geological and hydrological survey (UPN 
'Veteran' 1992), carried out in East Timor between August 
1990 and June 1992, suggests that a cement industry in the 
territory is viable because of its abundant raw materials. 
However, Aditjondro warns that the environmental impact 
of this industry must be assessed. 
v 
2. The garment trade 
East Timor' s traditional cloth, ta is, can be produced from 
local ra\v materials and developed without importing large 
amounts of foreign equipment. 
3. Tourism 
Tourism is an important source of income in most small 
island developing states (SIDS) in the Caribbean, Pacific 
and Indian oceans. It has been the largest contributor to 
GNP in the Bahamas (53 per cent), and Antigua (69 per 
cent). It can earn valuable foreign exchange earnings, for 
example US$94 million in the Maldives in 1994, which was 
74 per cent of its total foreign exchange earnings for that 
year. 
Tourism will certainly solve some of the economic 
difficulties of East Timor - and will contribute to 
government revenues, stimulate regional development, 
and increase employment and income. Tourism uses the 
existing natural environments of a country, such as the 
climate, beaches, sea, and other attractions, which require 
relatively low level investment. All these can be found in 
East Timar. Also, geologists agree that East Timor 
represents a laboratory for geological research because of 
its complex geomorphological structures. This could 
attract more overseas visitors. However, the tourist 
industry in East Timor must be developed in an holistic 
way, taking account of its institutions and culture. 
D. The oil and gas deal 
Like tourism, oil and gas will play a significant role in the 
economy of East Timor. The Zone of Cooperation (Timor 
Gap), an area of approximately 60,000 square kilometres, is 
rich in oil and natural gas fields. Petroleum reserves in the 
Zone have been estimated at between 500 and 7,000 
million barrels and there are some 50,000 billion cubic feet 
of natural gas. Undoubtedly, this would meet part of the 
demand for oil and gas in East Timor's neighbouring 
countries, particularly Australia and Indonesia, where 
demand is rising. Australia's own supplies are expected to 
decline sharply by 2005, while Indonesia is likely to 
become a net importer from the year 2000. Its petroleum 
demand has been growing at 7-8 per cent per year, and it is 
unlikely that its current level of liquids production, about 
1.5 million barrels per day, can be maintained until 2000. 
Not enough new discoveries are scheduled to come on 
stream over the next few years to compensate for the 
natural decline in mature fields (Petroleum Economist 
1993:11-12). 
The Zone's reserves may safely be assumed to be of 
considerable value, so it is one of the principal economic 
assets of the East Timorese people. Oil revenues will have 
a significant impact on the economy of East Timar. If the 
oil were to be sold at US$13 per barrel, it would generate 
an annual revenue of approximately US$2 billion. The 
revenue from oil and natural gas alone could rapidly 
tran sform Eas t Timor from an agriculturally based 
economy to one of the major oil exporters, raising living 
standards and gross national product. 
H owever, it is highly unlikely that Indonesia will 
simply hand over the treaty for East Timor to renegotiate 
with Australia. If the treaty cannot be renegotiated it is 
ques t ionable w h e ther East Timor's economic 
independence will be possible without oil and gas. This 
paper suggests that the short- and medium-term future of 
East Timor's economy must be based on non-oil products, 
although revenue from oil and gas production would no 
doubt stimulate a higher level of economic growth. 
As East Timar becomes a sovereign state it will be 
necessary to renegotiate the Timar Gap as soon as possible. 
But the issue could be included, as a 'confidence building 
measure', on the agenda of the intra-ministerial and 
ambassadorial talks between Indonesia and Portugal 
currently being held under the auspices of the United 
Nations secretary-general. 
E. Government expenditures and 
investments 
To expand agriculture for domestic consumption and 
commercial purposes in the years immediately following 
independence, the government will have to become an 
active agent of development. There will need to be 
intensive public sector investment, new state agencies to 
expand government services, new infrastructure 
constructed, considerable mechanisation in preparing, 
planting, cultivating, and fertilising land, and government 
measures to combat malaria and malnutrition. Although 
this would certainly increase government spending to 
more than 20 per cent of GDP in the first years of 
development, intervention should be limited to these areas 
only, while commercial activities in agriculture, 
manufacturing and services should be left to the private 
sector. 
F. Currency and exchange rate policy 
East Timor can have its own currency . Let us name it 
' Xana ' , after East Tim or's resistance leader, Xanana 
Gusmao. At an early stage the Xana must be pegged to the 
US dollar to benefit the economy in the short term, 
increasing the confidence of the private sector and 
encouraging foreign investors. 
East Timor's ability to benefit from global markets will 
partly depend on its exchange rate policies. Naturally, 
overvaluing the new currency is more likely to result in 
trade deficits, so the exchange rates must be kept in 
equilibrium. 
4. HUMAN RESOURCE BASE 
Common features of development in east Asian and Pacific 
countries is the 'availability of educated labour, able to re-
skill itself during the process of industrial upgrading, with 
high productivity at a level of wages very low for 
international standards', and the ability of these economies 
to adapt to the changing conditions of the world economy. 
Such characteristics mean countries could upgrade their 
technologies constantly, expand their markets and 
diversify their economies (Castells 1992:53, 54). A 'well-
developed entrepreneurial class and good social and 
physical infrastructure' were present when Fiji embarked 
on its economic policies (Elek et al 1993:750). 
In East Timor, there will be a shortage of qualified local 
people to fill middle and senior posts in the civil service. 
The number of local professionals needed to analyse 
economic problems, define policy options and manage the 
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entire process of preparing policy will be small or non-
existent at the time of independence. Heavy reliance on 
Indonesian staff for simple decisions will perpetuate East 
Timor' s dependence on foreign projects, concepts and 
goods. However, to achieve rapid economic growth, East 
Timor must have a population which is well educated and 
able to take full advantage of the many opportunities 
offered by the international community. 
One of the central characteristics of the development 
process in East Timor must be a shift from subsistence to 
market-oriented production, and the relationship of 
Timor' s women to these socio-economic changes will be 
very important. The majority of women in East Timor 
work in agriculture or in enterprises in the informal sector 
in urban areas, so the state will need to design 
development strategies that provide income-generating 
projects for women, and give them some social and 
economic autonomy. 
East Timor must channel men and women equally 
through education and training programmes, assisted by 
.. experts from various labour departments in the United 
Kingdom, Australia and Taiwan, who would help to plan 
and set targets for enrollment in vocational and higher 
education. The government must allocate a certain amount 
of money to education if East Timor is to develop its 
human resources quickly enough for industrialisation to be 
successful. 
In the short term, primary and junior education must be 
free and compulsory, making basic education universal, 
and creating a more literate work force equipped for 
·economic growth. Men and women wishing to continue 
studying after junior high level will have to pass an 
aptitude test to enter a senior high school, vocational high 
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• Neutral third countries, such as Switzerland, Belgium, or countries in the Asia-Pacific Rim should help to 
negotiate equal shares of oil and gas between East Timor and Australia, and should host the negotiations. 
DONOR AGENCIES 
• The World Bank, the European Union (EU), and other international or bilateral donors should stop aiding 
Indonesian projects in East Timor unless there is reliable evidence that the projects will benefit the Timorese. 
• International organisations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) should provide expert technical assistance and training in the area of trade. 
PORTUGAL 
• The Portuguese government should provide scholarships for undergraduate students who want to study in 
East Timor and postgraduate students who want to study abroad, in Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, 
South Africa, Malaysia, the United States, Brazil, the UK, and other EU countries. 
• A Consultative Group on East Timor should be set up in Portugal immediately, involving Timorese leaders, 
academics, Portuguese economic institutions, national and international professionals, and NGOs involved 
in East Timor, such as CAFOD, CIIR and CARITAS. The group should be responsible for formulating future 
policies and macro-economic programmes for the country. 
AUSTRALIA 
• The Australian government should halt any further exploitation of oil and gas in the Timor Gap. 
• The Australian government should provide access to data on the oil and gas explorations in the Gap. 
• The Australian government should recognise and accommodate the interests of the people of East Timor 
when exploring and exploiting the resources in the Timor Gap. 
NGOS 
viii 
• International and national NGOs should allocate 10 per cent of their budgets to research before and after 
implementing projects in the region. 
• NGOs should conduct research on adopting and adapting appropriate technologies in the territory to avoid 
the potential negative impacts of foreign technology and investment. 
• There should be research on the best methods of enhancing private sector development and foreign 
investment in the region. 
This supplement is published with issue 43 of Timor Link (June 1998) by CllR, 
Unit 3 Canonbury Yard, 190a New North Road, Islington, London Nl 7BJ 
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Reflections on a crisis 
An East Timorese resident in the territory 
tells Timor Link about the impact of the 
Indonesian crisis and fears for the 
future. 
How are the East Timorese coping with the effects 
of the Indonesian financial crisis? 
The population faces many hardships, but the 
implications are most serious for the 
infrastructure which Indonesia has created in 
the territory. Otherwise, life is much the same 
as it was in Portuguese times: economically 
nothing has changed much, despite 
Indonesian government claims to have 
developed East Timor. The East Timorese 
have not benefited from Indonesian 
'development' - we still queue for food as we 
did in colonial times. Price rises have not 
affected the Timorese greatly because they 
could not afford most things anyway. 
What about security? 
There are anxieties about security, in particular 
questions about what will become of the 
military infrastructure. What if the army ceases 
to be paid? Troops are already demoralised, 
and with their salaries now worth about one-
fifth of what they were, soldiers are beginning 
to question why they should stay. Given this, 
soldiers are more likely to extort credit and 
privileges from the Timorese population. 
It will be extremely expensive for J akarta to 
maintain a wasteful war in one of its remote 
outlying islands. Suharto did not rely on the 
market, but on speculation, bribery, and 
nepotism , and this has translated down to the 
grassroots of the army- so the entire military 
edifice is rotten with corruption. The danger 
is that so ldiers will inflict a new and more 
terrifying kind of violence on the indigenous 
population as they leave . 
In a time of transition what could be some of the 
other consequences? 
There could be a food shortage - flour will 
not be available so there will be no bread, 
there will be insufficient rice, and littl e 
transport to distribute food - so famine could 
result. Coordination of food distribution will 
be the main problem. Indonesia has built up 
rice stocks, but these could be destroyed. East 
Timor will be looking to Australia and other 
western countries to step in with speedy 
assistance. 
What needs to be done? 
Foreign donors should recognise the regime's 
failure and make future bail-outs dependent 
on Indonesia's withdrawal from East Timor. 
Now that money is coming directly from the 
IMF and the World Bank, the East Timorese 
should ask for concessions - openness, 
accountability, transparency, and democracy 
- as this money should not be used to cause 
human rights violations. 
What would a transition period entail? 
A transition period will entail further costs to all 
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the inhabitants of East Timor. Violence may 
occur as well as famine and human rights 
problems. Peop le are very keen for the 
International Committee of the Red Cross to 
remain in East Timor to monitor the situation. 
The physical isolation of East Timor might 
also cause difficulties if there is turmoil - if 
flights are cancelled, or telecommunication 
links disrupted, it will be impossible to tell the 
world outside what is happening. 
East Timor is entitled to see the UN 
resolutions implemented. The Security 
Council must guarantee assistance so that the 
transition in East Timor passes off as 
peacefully as possible. If the Indonesian police 
and army are withdrawn, a UN peacekeeping 
force might be necessary, or at least some 
form of UN supervision, and Jamsheed 
Marker will need to open an office in Dili . The 
church will also need to play a key role in 
bringing about reconciliation between 
different people. 
The Portuguese, as administering power, 
should also play a role after the period of 
transition. It should mobilise the European 
Union to assist, possibly by sending EU troops. 
EU countries look to Portugal for a lead, but 
should also give strong backing to it. 
The role of the British government will be 
to back both EU and UN initiatives both 
morally and materially. 
For security reasons, the identity of our East 
Timorese interviewee has been withheld. 
Konis Santana - guerrilla leader and diplomat 
On 1 April East Timorese activists abroad 
received news of the death of Konis 
Santana, head of the Executive Council 
of the Armed Struggle, and secretary 
of Fretilin's Directive Committee. 
Agio Pereira pays tribute. 
Reaction to the news that Konis Santana had died after falling down a cliff was that 
someone was playing an April Fool's trick. It was 
difficult to believe that a man who had lived in 
the mountains all his life could have died in this 
way. Sorrow followed, as did hatred for the 
Indonesian army, although the reality was that 
this could happen to anyone. The difference 
was that Konis was a strong guerrilla leader with 
unique abilities to keep the guerrilla going and 
to communicate on equal terms with the repre-
sentative of the resistance in exile,Jose Ramos-
Horta, and the imprisoned resistance leader 
Xanana Gusmao. It will be difficult for his 
replacement to demonstrate similar qualities. 
People's anger probably reflected the 
realisation that Konis's death could have far-
reaching effects on the struggle of the people of 
East Timor. 
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Little is known about the past of this charismatic 
guerrilla leader. In an interview broadcast by a 
Timorese radio programme in Sydney, Australia, 
Konis said he was born in Vero, a tiny village in one 
of the remotest areas in eastern East Timor, 
accessible only on foot. He did not wear clothes 
until the age of five. In the same interview he 
expressed his dislike for Portuguese colonial 
rulers' treatment of the Timorese. The Portuguese 
authorities, he said, used to visit his areas once 
every two years, and then only to collect tax and/ or 
to take strong young men to work for free 
elsewhere in Timor. His father, a barefooted 
Timorese, was once beaten until his skin was tom 
off 'because he could not afford to pay his tax 
dues '. This, said Konis, happened in front of him 
and his brothers when he was only a child, and left 
him 'traumatised'. 
Konis's ambition was to become a school 
teacher -virtually the only way to earn money 
to pay for food for his family and for his brothers' 
education. Born in 1956 or 1958 (at the time 
there was no official birth registry in East Timor), 
Konis went to school much later then the norm 
because of his isolated village life and 'hardly 
finished secondary school' . 
Such experience gave him strong enough 
reason to fight tyranny and oppression. 
Strategist 
For Jose Ramos-Horta, Konis was not only a 
guerrilla leader but also an astute diplomatic 
strategist. 'He understood the intricacies of 
diplomacy. He always supported me in my 
proposals for diplomatic solutions. He strongly 
supported the CNRM peace plan. ' 
As a young boy Konis was one of those who 
might have been mobilised for guerrilla warfare 
in East Timor against Portuguese rule. But 
Timor, unlike Mozambique, Angola, Guinea 
Bissau and Cape Verde, did not produce a 
Samora Machel, Agostinho Neto or Amilcar 
Cabral. The liberation struggle was a distant goal 
for the middle-class assimilados. 
It was not until the early 1980s that Konis 
emerged as a middle-ranking cadre. In photo-
graphs which circulated after the collapse of the 
ceasefire between Xanana Gusmao and general 
Purwanto, he appeared as a young man, wearing 
shorts in the liberated zones, holding a radio 
and tape recorder. He was then working for the 
department of information, in charge of the 
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collection of data on human 1ighL~ abuses, and 
supporting the mirk of Xanana Gusmao. 
In 198-l, as the political struggle between 
Xanana Gusmao and ~ buk Momk (the f01111er 
head ofFretilin Red Brigades) reached breaking 
point , Kon is emerged as a disciple of and 
ob\ious successor to Xanana. 
After Xanana was captured in Dili, in 
;\overnber 1992, Mau Hunu became head of 
the resistance until his capture six months later. 
After \tau Hu nu was captured, it was left to Kon is 
to prove himself. 
REVIEW 
Same difference 
East Timor, West Papua/lrian and Indonesia, 
Keith Suter, Minority Rights Group, 1998, 
33pp. 
A new report compares Indonesia's 
invasion of East Timor with its exploitation 
of West Papua. 
There is an obvious link between the struggles 
in West Papua and East Timar. Both 
populations suffer at the hands of the same 
undisciplined army, controlled by the same 
corrupt and undemocratic government. Yet the 
plight of the West Papuans, brought to the 
world's attention in 1996 when the Free Papua 
Movement abducted 24 environmentalists, has 
since faded into obscurity. While the situation 
in East Timar continues to attract international 
attention, few international NC.Os devote time 
to the story of West Papua, and there are few 
West Papuan advocates active on the world 
stage. For the sake ot the West Papuan cause, 
therefore, this report deserves wide circulation. 
The background to the situation in West 
Papua, and the parallels with East Timor, are 
described in the final section of the report. As 
with the Balibo declaration in East Timor, no 
proper consultation took place among the West 
Papuan people. A highly selective poll of pro-
lndonesian apologists was claimed to represent 
the will of the people. 
Guerrilla war 
:\ liberation struggle has been waged in West 
Papua since 1963, and like Falantil in East 
Timar the Free Papua Movement continues a 
guerrilla \\'<tr of attrition against the Indonesian 
occupying forces. West Papua has also suffered 
the consequences oflndonesia's transmigration 
polic\', with dislocation and ethnic tension 
feeding popular resentment O\'er land re-
distribution and traditional farming methods. 
However, \\'est Papua has had a far worse 
experience of foreign transnational companies 
than East Timar has. Mining of West Papuan 
gold and copper resen'es has had devastating 
e nvironmental and social consequences , 
displacing local people and disrupting their 
lives without paying compensation. Logging 
companies are decimating the rainforest, 
causing 'oil degradation and loss of wildlife, all 
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Kon is did not wait to re-organise the resistance. 
He tested the ground and considered all possi-
bilities. He even proposed that Ramos-Horta take 
over the leadership until Xanana Gusrnao's 
executive powers were re-instated. The two men 
came up with a troika whereby Taur Matan Ruak 
(chief of staff ofFalantil) , Ramos-Horta and Konis 
Santana led the stmggle in different fields, until 
such time as Xanana 's powers had been fully 
reinstated. In March 1993, the head of the 
Clandestine Front, Sabalae and Konis Santana, 
meeting with other leaders in Dili , East Timor, 
of which the Indonesian government has 
ignored. 
The report begins with the recent history of 
Indonesia. It points out that economics has 
succeeded cold war politics as the dominant 
influence on western governments ' policies 
towards Jakarta. Since publication, the report 
has been rather overtaken by events, with the 
impact of the Asian financial crisis and Indo-
nesia 's own political crisis emerging. Rising 
prices and unemployment have acutely 
exacerbated the social inequalities which Suter 
describes and although, as he points out, a 
growing middle class and a nascent democracy 
movement have been calling for change, 
evidence of an alternative to military rule is thin. 
Resistance 
Turning to East Timar, Suter offers a thorough 
examination the resistance - now locked in 
stalemate with the Indonesian armed forces-and 
explains its impact in the international arena. 
On the role of the United Nations, Suter 
draws some interesting distinctions between the 
different UN resolutions on Indonesia and East 
Timar. These might have been even more 
useful had he added an analysis of the UN-led 
negotiations over East Timor - those between 
Portugal and Indonesia and the All Inclusive 
Intra-East Timorese dialogue. It would also have 
been worth examining the potential for 
progress offered by UN secretary-general Kofi 
Anna.n's appointment in 1996 of a special 
representative ,Jamsheed Marker. 
US complicity with the Indonesian invasion 
of East Timar receives deserved exposure in 
Suter's study. With an eye on more recent 
history, however, he might have asked whether 
moves in late 1997 to block the use of US 
weapons in East Timar, and greater public and 
media disquiet over support for Suharto, signify 
a recent fundamental change of attitude in the 
United States. Suter is also right to underline 
Portugal's role in raising the profile of East 
Timor. It could be added that Portugal's role 
should be seen in the context of the European 
Union and of the 1996 EU Common Position 
on East Timor, the framework for EU policy 
whose potential NGOs are seeking to maximise. 
Church action 
Suter under-plays the roles of the Catholic and 
the Protestant churches in East Timor. Bishop 
declared Xanana Gusmao's executive powers 
reinstated. 
Kon is Santana once said of Xanana: 'They 
have captured him, but if they don't kill him, 
that's the end oflndonesia in East Timor.' The 
fact that Xanana was not killed in custody was 
taken by the guerrilla forces as the ultimate test 
of his ability to devise strategies, to implement 
them and to ensure success for the future. Nino 
Kon is Santana knew it all along but, like Amilcar 
Cabral, he did not live to l\~tness the final victory. 
His death is, indeed, a great tragedy. 
Belo's contribution deserves greater attention 
and his position should be seen as more than 
'circumspect'. Belo denounces human rights 
abuses by the authorities and under his 
leadership the Catholic church has posed a 
consistent challenge to the authorities. 
In the past, as part of the Indonesian 
Communion of Churches, the Protestant 
church has tended to support Indonesian 
government policy. But in recent years 
increasing numbers of East Timorese have 
converted to Protestantism and, in 1994 the 
Gereja Kristen Timor Timur sought and gained 
independent membership of the World 
Council of Churches. Its leader, Reverend 
Arlindo Marca! has often argued for a 
referendum on East Timor 's future. These 
changes have helped to strengthen ecumenical 
solidarity and cooperation around the world. 
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